ABSTRACT This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.
Introduction
Many human interactions in which economists are interested involve agents voluntarily forming associations in order to undertake joint activities. Important examples of such organizations are households and firms. Other examples include organizations formed to provide some set of local public goods, such as a condominium association. There is an extensive literature on matching models which analyzes the equilibria of job-worker or husband-wife matching models, as well as an extensive literature on associations which provide local public goods, commonly referred to as clubs. 1 In these literatures, cooperative and noncooperative game theoretic tools have been the predominant mode of analysis. In this paper we show that general equilibrium analysis with linear price systems can be extended to quite general environments in which associations are being endogenously formed, and hence that all the standard competitive results apply.
The associations in our model can undertake a broad range of possible activities, encompassing both consumption and production activities. The technology available to these associations can depend on the characteristics of its membership and can deal with the jointness of activities within the association. We do require that any possible association be small relative to the large number of people in the economy, however. We will refer to these associations as clubs because they fali within the spirit of the club literature. We use the term club type to refer not only to the relevant characteristics of the membership, but also to the nature of the economic activities undertaken.
There are some complications with this approach, though. One cômplication is that the set of possible club types is large and membership is discrete. We deal with the first problem by 1 For the cooperative and noncooperative literatures on matching models standard references are Roth and Sotomayor (1990) and Osbome and Rubinstein (1990) , respectively. In the club literature, the standard medel is one in which there is an excludable local public good to be consumed with congestion and a private consumption good. Standard references for this literature are Comes and Sandler (1986) or Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) . considering each separate club type as a separate commodity, with, possibly, a continuum of .. differentiated commodities. To deal with the problem of discrete membership, we follow Mas-Colell (1975) , Hart (1979) , and Jones (1984) in using the space of signed measures as our commodity space. Another complication with our environment is that in club environrnents where there is a deterministic commodity space and people maximize expected utility, there typically exist gains from trade in randomized contracts, due to the indivisibility in agents' consumption sets. In order to deal with this problem, we folIow Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) and Rogerson (1984 Rogerson ( , 1988 and consider consumption possibility sets that consist of probability distributions over final consumption bundles.
Our choice of commodity space greatly simplifies a competitive analysis of our environment.
While agents' possible choices over clubs are not convex, their possible choices over random contracts that specify the probability of membership are. Since the membership in any one club is small relative to the size of the population, the aggregate production technology is a convex cone.
Additionally, since we will restrict ourselves to economies with a continuum of agents, but only a finite number of types, the convexity of our economies permits us to consider only type-identical allocations: Each agent of a given type chooses the same point in the commodity space. As a result, virtually alI the classical general equilibrium results for convex economies with a finite set of agents .
can be extended to our club economies. The standard results on the equivalence of core and competitive allocations with a continuum of agents can also be shown to hold.
The previous literature on club economies has considered the same questions that we address here, but with some important differences. 2 Wooders (1978 Wooders ( , 1980 Wooders ( , 1989 analyzes club economies 2There is also literature on clubs in which it is assumed that the club technology does not depend on the characteristics of the members of the club. (See Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) .) This is commonly referred to in the club literature as the case of anonymous crowding. Unlike this literature, we will use the term anonymous to refer to situations in which the price system is type-with standard-competitive prices for private goods and Lindahl, or person-speciftc, prices for club goods and shows that in large economies the core is not empty, and the set of core and the "market" equilibrium alIocations are equivalent. We think that there is a problem with market equilibrium with individual-speciftc prices. The assumption of price taking is just not a reasonable one when prices are personalized. (See Chari and Jones (1991) .) Scotchmer (1993) shows the equivalence of equal-utility core alIocations (where alI agents of the same type receive equal utility leveis in the core alIocation} and market alIocations with type-speciftc prices. Even the work on the relationship between equal utility core allocations and competitive equilibria suffers from the deftciency that these alIocations are often not core or equilibrium alIocations when agents have access to a randomizing device.
Our work improves on this earlier Iiterature in the following respects: First, our switch to a lottery commodity space alIows us to model the outcomes that will arise if people have access to a randomizing device. Second, with our commodity space ali core allocations are equal utility alIocations. Third, the issue of the existence of a competitive equilibrium with a type-speciftc price system depends only on the standard conditions required in the classical existence proofs. Indeed our structure is in a sense just the standard Arrow-Debreu structure. 3 And ftnally, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and core allocations are equivalent if these classical conditions are satisfted.
We should also mention the related work of Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1994) .
The example that we consider in the ftrst section of this paper is related to the model in their more but not individual-specifte. Additionally, Seotehmer (1985) has looked at deeentralizing club eeonomies in whieh the owners of the elub have market power due to entry barriers.
3With Arrow-Debreu, eommodities are indexed by events, and these events ean be random . Thus the lottery equivalent exists in the Arrow-Debreu world, provided there is some random variable with a eontinuous density. recent paper, which they analyzed from both a cooperative and noncooperative perspective. In their two period medel, matching takes place in the second period and agents mak:e an investment decision in the first period which increases the set of second period payoffs to the pairo Beeause there are elose substitutes with regard to matehing, the strong presumption of ineffieieney with regard to investment and resouree division with the pair is removed if agents ean eommit when they mateh over resouree division within the pairo This so-called "weak" eommitment teehnology is shown to be equivalent to a "strong" commitment teehnology in which agents can commit prior to mak:ing their investment decisions. They also show that these core allocations are decentralizable as market outcomes for the specific example they considero
The remainder of the paper is divided into two sections. In lhe first we analyze a simple two sex matehing model in order to illustrate how to represent the model environment as a eeonomy in the classical general equilibrium sense-that is, one with no externalities. We show that a commodity space that allows for trade in randomized contraets can and typieally does lead to substantially different equilibrium allocations relative to the set of equilibria in which the commodity space only allows for deterministie exchanges. In the second we consider a mueh more general matehing model and show how the standard results in general equilibrium theory can be readily extended. Sinee one seems to observe a great preponderanee of methods of gambling over wealth transfers relative to lotteries over final eonsumption allocations, we were motivated in this section to also consider an alternative decentralization of our environment. In this alternative decentralization there are gambles over value transfers in the first stage and a standard competitive economy in the second, where ali the trades are deterministic exchanges. We show that the set of equilibrium allocations for the two decentralizations are equivalent.
A Prototype Environrnent With Clubs
We begin by eonsidering a simple model of household formation. We then show, through a suitable detinition of the eommodity spaee, how this strueture ean be studied using valuation equilibrium theory with its single budget eonstraint and linear valuation or pricing function. We use this example to explain why within matching models a commodity space whieh includes randomized alloeations is appropriate. This is done by eonsidering a simple example and showing that under a deterministie deeentralization there are mutually advantageous gains from entering into trade in randomized eontracts. We then formally present a valuationequilibrium model of this simple matehing environment, and show that the welfare theorems apply and that a competitive equilibrium exists when the eommodity spaee allows for trade in randomized contraets. We then develop the implications of the tirst welfare theorem and the eonneetion between planner's problems and equilibrium alloeations in eonvex economies to develop an algorithm for computing alI competitive equilibria of the prototype eeonomy. Finally, we show that the properties of this equilibrium alloeation differ substantialIy from those in an economy without random contraets.
The Environment
There is a eontinuum of people. They are of two types, which we will refer to as male or female, and whieh we will denote by s E {f,m}. When referring to an agent oftype s, we will use s' to denote the agent's opposite sexo The measure of persons having type s is given by Às > o.
There are two types of goods in the model: a personal eonsumption good and a elub eonsumption good. A matehed pair of the opposite sex can consume both a pair-specitic publie good or club good, and individuaIly, the personal consumption good. People can be matched with just one person of the opposite sexo The unmatched ean consume only the personal consumption good. People are endowed with the personal eonsumption good, and W s denotes his or her endowment leveI. We assume that mere is a production technology for converting one unit of the personal consumption good into half a unit of the club good.
The underlying consumption possibility set is A x B, where A is the set of feasible personal consumptions and B the set of feasible pair or club consumptions. In this section, A will be R+ and B will be either the interval [0,b max 1 or a tinite subset of this interval that includes zero. Preferences are identical for all people and are given by 
Valuation Equilibrium Without Random Contracts
To apply valuation equilibrium analysis, the balance condition for feasibility must depend only on the sum of the individuaIs' commodity vectors. Feasibility requires that the number of males consuming any given nonzero leveI of the c1ub good must be equal to the number of females consuming that leveI. Thus, we index the club good by sex in order to distinguish between the sex of the person consuming a particular leveI of the c1ub good. Further, since this equality must hold for every leveI of the club good, we treat every leveI of b for each sex as a different commodity.
These considerations, following Mas-Colell (1975) , lead us to use the commodity space L = RXM(B) XM(B), where M(B) denotes the set of signed measures on the Borel sigma algebra of B.
An element of L is the triplet (xO,xf'Xm). The element Xo is the personal consumption good while the elements Xs are signed measures of consumptions of the c1ub goods of which there can be a continuum. In the case that the set of c1ub consumptions is tinite, the Xs are tinite dimensional vectors .
With this commodity space there is a fundamental indivisibility in the consumption possibility Given the nature of the consumption possibility sets, ali x belonging to these sets can be characterized by a pair of real numbers (a,b) where a is personal consumption and b is club
consumption. An allocation specifies the distributions of the (a,b) for each type. As we are not keeping track of names, a deterministic allocation will be a set of measures which give the distribution of consumption choices of each type.
An equilibrium consists of a price system and a mal e and a female distribution of consumption choices which satisfy the following conditions: (i) the total measure of the distribution of consumption choices for each sex s is Às, (ii) the measure of males and females consuming any nonzero leveI of cIub-consumption are equal,4 (iii) total personal consumption plus two times the total consumption of b over all clubs must be less than or equal to the total endowment, and (iv) the supports of the distributions of consumption choices must consist only of points which are in 
This program has a unique solution which determines the core allocation for this economy. A deterministic competitive equilibrium exists if and only if constraint (5) is binding at the optimum.
Constraint (5) will be binding at the optimum if and only if wf is below some criticai value, which, 4To be exact, the measure of males and females with club consumption leveis which lie in any subset of B not containing O must be equal.
depending on u and v, could be plus infinity. If this constraint is. binding, the equilibrium distribution of consumption choices for females has measure Xc on the point (a7,b*) and zero measure elsewhere. The equilibrium distribution of consumption choices for males has measure Xc on the point set {(a,ri,b*)}, measure Àm -Àfon th~ point set {(wm,O)}, and zero measure elsewhere.
The equilibrium prices of b* are Pm(b*) = v(b*)/u'(arit) and Pt<b*) = 2b* -pm(b*). For other b commodities for which markets clear at zero, we pick the demand reservation prices for males,
The allocation implied by the solution to this programming problem is a Pareto optimum in a world without the technology to trade in randomized contracts. If people have access to a randomizing mechanism, however, this allocation is neither a competitive equilibrium nor a Pareto optimal allocation. We now establish this point.
To establish that this allocation is not a competitive equilibrium, we show that two males can enter into a mutually beneficiai gamble. One mutually beneficiai gamble is the fair one in which the winner receives P m (b*)/2 units of the consumption good from the lo ser. The winner and loser both have personal consumption w m -Pm(b*). The loser has levei O club consumption while the winner has levei b* club consumption. Both these males have expected utility
which exceeds the utility that they would have realized if they had not entered into the gamble; that is, it exceeds u(wm> = u(arit) + v(b*). This last point follows from the strict concavity of the u 5 An arbitrary matching of males and females in which each female gets matched with one and only one male, and with the allocation being that a matched pair's consumption is determined by the previous programming problem, while unmatched males simply consume their endowment, is a core allocation. In this core allocation, the welfare leveis of males will differ if (5) does not bind, and hence it cannot be supported as a competitive equilibrium. This core allocation could be supported as a quasi-competitive equilibrium (see later discussion) but quasi-competitive equilibria need not be competitive equilibria even though there exists a cheaper point in each agent's budget set since the implicit consumption sets are not convex due to the discrete nature of matching. function and lhe fact that Pm(b*) To show that the deterministic competitive equilibrium is not a Pareto optimum we extend this argument to show that the welfare leveI of a positive measure of males can be improved relative to the deterministic equilibrium allocation, while leaving the utility of other people unchanged. To do this, simply take an equal positive measure of matched and unmatched males and repeat the above argument leaving others with the same commodity vectors. This establishes the existence of a Pareto superior feasible allocation. We now develop a competitive equilibrium model with randomized contracts and show that a competitive equilibrium always exists and that competitive equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal.
Valuation Equilibria With Lotteries
Here we will present a formal description of our simple example in which we allow for trade in randomized contracts. We will show that both welfare theorems apply and that a competitive equilibrium always exists.
The form of the example that we will consider is slightly more general in that we will allow for a finite set of possible types of persons, indexed by i = (s,w) , where agents can differ in terms of their sex, s E {m,f}, and their endowment, w > O. Once again we will use s to denote an individual's own sex and s' the opposite sexo 6If v(a) is not strict1y concave beneficiai gambles may not existo In particular, if v(a) = a, gambles are not needed. (See Mas-Colell 1975.) The commodity space is once again given by L = R x M(B) x M(B) with element x = (xO,xf'''m)' The commodity space norm is the sum of the absolute value of Xo and the total variation norms of Xc and "m; that is, (8) The consumption possibility set of a type i person is where the number 3uu.x exceeds tiÀi",/minÀ i , which is an upper bound for feasible type-identical consumptions of the private good. The type i utility function Ui:
The endowment of a type i is e i = ("'i'O,O) E L+. The aggregate production possibility set is (11) Y = {y E L: yt<Q) = Ym(Q) for any measurable Q ~ B+ + and
The only major change from our deterministic economy is that we have replaced the restriction in the consumption sets that xs(') E {0,1} by the restriction xs(') E [0,1]. The consumption sets are now convexo Here Xs(Q) has the interpretation of being the probability measure that is placed on outcomes in the measurable set Q C B.
We restrict attention to allocations with the property that all people-of the sarne type have the sarne commodity point. Given that preferences are convex, this is an innocuous restriction that drarnatically simplifies notation. 8 Given this restriction, the resource balance constraint is simply 7By measurable we mean an element of the borel sigma algebra of B which we denote by B(B).
8More formal1y, we say competitive equilibria are in the sarne equivalence class if the p is the sarne, and the type-mean commodity vectors are identical for all types. Within every equivalence c1ass of equilibria there is one type-identical equilibrium. Proo/. If B is finite, the commodity space is finite dimensional and Theorem 15.7 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) implies (type-identical) Pareto optimum can be supported as a (type-homogenous) quasi-competitive equilibrium with transfers. 9
To establish the second welfare theorem for our economy when the set of club consumptions is not finite, we first establish the second welfare theorem for an economy with a larger production possibility set. This larger aggregate production possibility set has a nonempty interior and has the same sets of (type-identical) Pareto optima and competitive equilibrium as our economy .
Consider the economy with aggregate production possibility set
This aggregate technology set is the sum of Y and another technology set which permits the production of the goods ys(b) without matching. Let (J be sufficiently large that for type-identical Pareto optimal alIocations this technology will not be operated. The set Y' has an interior and consequently there is a quasi-competitive equilibrium with a price system in the dual of our commodity space. Given that y* belongs to Y, y* maximizes value over the smalIer set Y given that it maximizes value over the larger set Y'. Thus there is a quasi-competitive equilibrium for the prototype economy with a price system in the dual of our commodity space.
Not alI points in this dual have the dot product representation that we require for our definition of competitive equilibrium. Given that people discount and truncation is possible (that is Assumptions 15. 1-15.7, 15.8', and 15.9' in Stokey and Lucas (1989) are satisfied), a quasicompetitive equilibrium with transfers exists with a dot product representation if one exists with a price system that does not have a dot product representation.
lO
For any Pareto optima with xÁ > O for alI i, and its associated quasi-competitive equilibrium, there will be a cheaper point in the consumption possibility set for every type i. This condition, lOBefore this theorem can be applied the ~ must be modified so that truncation is possible. This is done as follows. The point zero is removed from B, and the requirement that xs(B) = 1 is replaced by the requirement that xs(B) S 1. Note that v(O) = O. along with convexity of preferences and consumption sets and continuity of preferences, guarantees that a quasi-competitiveequilibrium is a competitive equilibrium. O PROPOsrnON 3. A competitive equilibrium always exists for these economies in our class . For B an interval, we follow Bewley (1972) and take the limit of a sequence of equilibria for economies with finite B sets. For the n th economy with a restricted commodity space the set of possible club consumptions is
We extend the nth equilibrium in the restricted commodity space to our general commodity space B as follows. We set Y n = Y n Bn' so for the n th economy only measures with support in Bn are feasible. The corresponding allocations are defined in the more general commodity space in the obvious manner; that is, by requiring that they agree on Bn and put zero weight on subsets of B that do not contain points in Bn' We extend the price system as follows, where throughout the numeraire is personal consumption which has a price of one. For the n th economy, for b's which males consume with positive probability, we use equilibrium prices for the restricted finite dimensional economy. For other b's, we set pC:(b) equal to the demand reservation prices of the males. We set rfrn)(b) = 2b -pC;l(b); that is, equal to the supply reservation price given p~(b). Given that v '(b) is bounded by assumption, the slopes of the p~(b) functions are bounded uniforrnly in b and n.
For each economy in our general commodity space with restricted p~oduction set Y D' we have constructed a competitive equilibrium. There will be a subsequence of equilibria for which the allocations converge weak star and the pricing functions Ps converge uniformly. The space of feasible allocations is closed and bounded. This implies that the set of feasible allocations is weak star compact which in turn implies the existence of a weak star convergent subsequence. The existence of a price subsequence which converges uniformly in the Loc norm is guaranteed given that the values and the slopes of the Ps(b) functions are bounded in absolute value uniformly in b and n.
The limit of the sequence of competitive equilibrium for the tinite economies is an equilibrium for the limiting economy. O
Properties or Pareto Optimal and Equilibrium Allocations
In the previous section we found that competitive equilibria allocations are Pareto optima.
Consequently, any properties that the Pareto optima have are shared by the competitive equilibria.
In this section, we establish properties of competitive equilibrium allocations by establishing the properties of the Pareto optima.
The prototype economy of the previous section is convexo Consequent1y, the set of Pareto optima is the closure of the set of solutions to weighted social planner's problems with positive weights. The 8 weighted anonymous social planner problem, where the sum of the 8 i is one and the
subject to feasibility. These programs are weak star continuous concave programming problems.
Given that the constraint set is weak star compact and nonempty, the set of maxima is nonempty and Proof. This result follows from the strict concavity of u, the underlying utility function on personal consumption. O A match type is detined by the endowments of the two parties to the match. There is a tinite number ofpossible match types. Proof. If (i) were not troe, the objective could be increased by shifting consumption from (w' ,s) types to (w,s) types while maintaining feasibility. If (ii) did not hold, then the objective could be increased by the following switch. Switch a positive measure of type (w,s) in a club with club consumption b ws with an equal measure type (w' ,s) who are in clubs with club consumption bw's· Given (i), (ii) , and the fact that the underlying utility functions are increasing, (iii) follows. O We now use these properties of Pareto optima to deduce properties of competitive equilibria.
Necessarily, competitive equilibrium utility is increasing in endowment. Therefore, a competitive equilibrium is a solution to some weighted social planner's problem with weights weakly increasing in endowments for each sex. l1 This leads to PROPOsmON 7. Competitive equilibria are characterized by all individuaIs of a given type having the same personal consumption. Further, equilibria are characterized by richer people of the same sex having either (i) larger personal and club consumptions or (ii) the same personal consumption.
Proof. This follows from the tirst welfare theorem, Propositions 4-6, and the fact that people with larger endowments must have higher equilibrium utilities.
Computing Lottery Equilibria ror the Sim pie Example
We now return to our original two type example. As we have already established, a lottery valuation equilibrium is efficient. Therefore, ali males have an identical personal consumption leveI, as do all females. -We denote these leveis as '\n and ar respectively. Efficiency also requires that all the females be paired and that club good consumption be identical for all matches. Letting Pm and Pf be the male and female prices of b levei club consumption, any set of {ar,llxn,b,pf,Pm> satisfying the following tive equations determines a lottery equilibrium in the case where Àm > Àf: Let ir denote the fraction of females and consider the case where wf = w m = 1. The symmetry of the model implies that equilibrium utilities satisfy Uri;(ir) = U'1(1-ir), and that the club good consumption levei of matched pairs along with the sex-specific prices, are symmetric around 1/2. We plot the equilibrium utility function of males in Figure l ,along with the utility levei in the deterministic economy. Note the equilibrium utility levei in the lottery does not exhibit the knife edge property of the deterministic economy. Instead, a sex benefits at the margin if their relative number is smaller. Secondarily, lhe band of indeterminacy at 1/2 is smaller in the lottery economy than in the deterministic economy because in the lottery economy some of the surplus from matching -begins to accrue to the more numerous sex prior to the equalization of relative numbers. This occurs because in the lottery economy people can reduce their probability of being matched, and this extra margin reduces the "market power" of the scarce sex relative to the deterministic economy where matching is al1 or nothing. As a result, in the lottery economy the females do relatively worse as ir approaches 1/2 from below, since in equilibrium they are not able to force the males down to their no trade welfare leveIs.
In the lonery economy, and unlike the deterministic economy except at T = 112, the equilibrium allocation varies with 7r. The leveI of club good consumption declines monotonically as 7r approaches 1/2 from above or below. This is because the implicit transfer from unrnatched agents to matched agents is going to zero. The leveI of male personal consumption is 1 at 7r = O, somewhat above the female leveI. Male personal consumption monotonically falls as 7r rises to 112, while the female leveI rises monotonically and becomes larger than the male levei prior to 7r reaching 112.
In the limiting case, as 7r ... 1, the probability of a female getting matched is going to zero.
Note that since v(·) is bounded, this implies that 7rpf'" O, otherwise the females would be forced below their no-trade welfare leveI in the Iimit. Since in equilibrium the number of probability units of being matched that each female is purchasing must also go to zero, the female's marginal price of being matched is converging to v(b)/u'(1). The equilibrium welfare leveI of the males in the limit is therefore the solution to the following maximization problem:
Uri;(I) = max{u(~) + v(b)} subject to ~ + 2b ::; 1 + v(b)/u'(l). The females welfare leveI is just their no-trade welfare leveI, u(l).
If 'Ir ~ 1/2, alI types identical Fareto optimal and the competitive equilibrium allocations involve gambling. If 7r = 1/2, however, all Pareto optimal and competitive equilibrium allocates are deterministic.
Alternative Decentralizations
Consider our simple two type example when there are twice as many males as females. The equilibrium allocation for our lottery economy could be supponed by different decentralizations.
One way is for two male agents to get together, pool their resources, and enter into an arrangement with a female agent in which they agreed to contribute Pm(b*), while setting aside a personal consumption levei of ~. = ""m -Pm(b*)/2 for each of them. They then flip a coin to see which one of them gets to be matched with the female, and thereby consumes the club good along with his personal consumption good. In this scenario, the males are gambling directly over final allocations.
An alternatively way is that they first entered into the following wealth gamble: they flip a coin, and the loser pays the winner Pm(b*)/2; after which they face a standard deterministic market in final consumption, which here includes the c1ub good. The first scenario is essentially the decentralization that we have consider thus far, though the second may seem more appealing on positive grounds.
However, this discussion suggests that the set of equilibrium allocations are equivalent under either decentralization. Later, we show for the general class.of club economies that this is in fact the case.
A More General Class of Economies With Clubs
The method of decentralization that we have considered is applicable to a richer class of environments than the simple example that we have thus far considered might suggest. Here we indicate how one can accommodate a much wider range of matching models, with a greater variety of types and a more extensive set of joint activities being undertakeno We can also allow for multiple club membership; for example an individual can be a member of both a household and a production clubo Set of People: There are a finite number of types of people indexe~ by i E I. The measure of type i is Àj > 00 We will refer to a distinction between two types of people as being basic if some club technology does not treat them as perfect substitutes. In the previous section the sex distinction is basico Type i's basic type is Si E S, where S is a finite set. Aggregate Production Possibility Set: In order to determine whether or not a point y E L is in the aggregate production set Y, there must be a distribution of types of c1ubs in each category which is consistent both with y and T j for ali j = 1, ... , J. Since any number of clubs of a given type ean be -operated and the output of any elub has measure zero, the aggregate production technology is a cone. The specification of Y requires that we first specify the set of possible measure of club types that are operated, given the elub teehnologies. To do this we define ~ to be the set of measures on M + (A x Bj x N) with support in T j . The measure Ôj E ~j specifies the number of clubs of category j belonging to the Borel measurable subsets of T j .
The aggregate production possibility set is y "= {y E L: 3 a set of measures {Ôj} with Ôj E ~ for which
all j, s, and measurable Q}.
Constraint (i) is that the net supplies of commodities a summed over all clubs is equal to aggregate net supply of a. Constraints (ii) are that the measure of people of type s receiving club consumption b j E Q in the output measure be consistent with the distribution of clubs in category j.
Remark: Given "that both the consumption possibility sets and the preference ordering are convex, then for any equilibrium there is an equivalent type-identical equilibrium. The equivalence is in terms of the price system p, the aggregate supply y, the expected utilities, and for eaeh type the distribution of c over people of that type.
Price System and Competitive Eguilibrium: A price system for our economy is a eontinuous x i * maximizes Ui(x) subject to x E Xi and p • x ~ P' e i ,
(ii) y* maximizes p' y subject to y E Y, and (iii) Ei~(xi* -e i ) = y*.
The WelC3l'e Theorems and Existence
As in the simple economy, the first welfare theorem follows from local nonsatiation. (See Theorem 15.3 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) .) Given the convexity of consumption sets, continuity of preferences, and our restriction to type identical alIocations, if there exists a point in each type's consumption set that is strictly preferred to alI points which are that type's consumption for some feasible allocation, then local nonsatiation will hold.
Just as in our two-sex matching model establishing the second welfare theorem is somewhat more complicated. If L were finite dimensional and/or Y had an interior point, Theorem 15.4 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) could be applied to conclude that ali Pareto optimum can be supported as a quasi-competitive equilibrium with transfers. If this is not the case, then one may be able to proceed, as in the two-sex matching model, to establish the second welfare theorem for an economy with a larger production possibility set that has an interior, but with same set of Pareto optima and competitive equilibrium as our economy.
The second welfare theorem guarantees the existence of a competitive equilibrium in which the price system is a continuous linear functional on the commodity space. This does not imply that this price system has a dot product representation when the commodity space is infinite dimensional.
To establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium with transfers and with a price system that has a dot product representation, we verify that assumptions 15.8' and 15.9' in Stokey and Lucas (1989, p. 468.) hold and apply their Theorem 15.9. Assumption 15.8' requires that if x E ~, the modification of x obtained by setting the Xs equal to zero on some measurable subset of B is also in
If wi E C i , the x({wiD correspond to the zero point. More generally (see Prescott and RiosRull 1992) for the case wi ~ Cio Assumption 15.9' is essentially that preferences are weak: star continuous which is the case given expected utility maximization and the fact that the function p is bounded and continuous.
If C is finite, the existence proof discussed in McKenzie (1981) will generally apply. Note that (i) the consumption sets are closed and convex, (ii) the preference ordering is continuous and quasi concave, and (iii) the aggregate production set is a closed convex cone. The additional assumptions that need to be satisfied are:
(vi) There is a common point in the relative interiors of Y and X = r:IÀi(~ + {-e i n.
(vii) For any two nonempty, disjoint partitions of I, I', and I", and x' = y -x", where x' E r:I'Ài~ + {-eiD, x" E r:I.Ài~ + {-eiD and y E Y, there exists a w E r:I.Ài~ + {-eiD, such that x' + x" + w E Y, and x' + w can be decomposed into an allocation for I' which is weak:ly preferred by ali members of I' and strictly by at least one.
There are obviously many ways to satisfy (iv). For example, in our simple _two-type matching model autarky is feasible. If we assume that the projection of T j on A x Bj only intersects the positive orthant at {O} for ali j, then the finite dimensional version of our general model satisfles (v). There are many ways to satisfy (vi); the requirement that there is a feasible set of net trades and associated output which lie in the interior of the smallest hyperplane containing Y and the smallest hyperplane containing the sum of the sets of net trades consistent with both individual consumption sets and endowments. -There are also many ways to satisfy (vii) which ensures that ali agents have positive income. In the simple example the existence of a good which is desired by ali and with which every type is positively endowed guarantees (vii).
If C is not finite, the commodity space is infinite dimensional and establishing the existence of a competitive equilibrium is more difficult. A standard method of proof is show the limit of a sequence of equilibria for finite dimensional economies exists and is an equilibrium for the infinite dimensionallimit economy. This was the approach we followed in the simple example. An outline of this approach as applied to our more general class of economies is as follows. Restrict the aggregate production possibility set to elements whose suppon belong to finite set C n C C where ali points in C lie in a lIn-neighborhood of at least one some point in Co. given the underlying utility function Uj(c) have uniformly bounded slope. This completes the outline of the extension to economies with C being a compact metric space.
Equivalence of Core and Equilibrium Allocations
In this section we show that the standard arguments with regard to the equivalence of the set of core and equilibrium allocations hold with a lottery commodity space. (See Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988) .) That this was not the case in our prototype economy with a deterministic commodity space was pointed out in foomote 5. In order to specify a core aIlocation we will need to aIlow for aIlocations in which people of a given type not only do not receive the same commodity point, but -may in fact enjoy ditferent welfare leveIs. We then show that any core aIlocation must satisfy equal welfare among people of the same type. Next we show that any equilibrium aIlocation is in the core. FinaIly we show that given a core allocation there exists a price system which will support it as a quasi competitive equilibrium, and discuss the conditions under which a quasi competitive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.
A general definition of an allocarion is a set of measures Z = {Zj}, where Zj is a map from the Borel sigma algebra of L to R+ such that Zj(Xj) = Àj all i. A suballocarion is similar to an aIlocation except that we weaken the membership restriction to be Àj(z) == Zj(~) ~ Àj for alI i. An (sub) aIlocation Z is feasible if: (i) the support of Zj is a subset of Xj for ali i, and (ii) y(z) ==
We say (sub) allocation z Pareto dominares (sub) aIlocation z if (i) Mz) = À(z) and
aIl i E I, u E R with strict inequality for some (i,u) . (i') If x' is in the support of zi, then for any x E ~, Uj(x) ~ Uj(x') implies p' x ~ p' x'.
PROPOSITION 9. If [z,y,p] is a competitive equilibrium, then its allocation z is a core allocation.
12This proposition was established in Kaneko and Wooders (1986) . We include a proof for completeness.
Proof. We nete first that for a competitive equilibrium ali people of the same type have the same utility leveI. If suballocation z blocked z, for ali people in z with strict inequality for those in i whose utility is strictly higher than under the z allocation. This implies that
Feasibility of z requires y(z) E Y. But, given Y is a cone, the maximum equilibrium profits must be zero. This contradiction establishes the proposition. O In order to show the existence of a price system which supports a core allocation as a quasicompetitive equilibrium we will need to apply the Hahn-Banach theorem. However, just as with the second welfare theorem, the potential emptiness of the interior of the production set when the commodity space is infinite dimensional precIudes this theorem's direct application. There are two obvious resolutions to this problem: (i) assume that C is finite and hence L is finite dimensional, or (ii) construct an alternative production set Y' which inc1udes Y and for which the set of ParelO optimal allocations is the same regardless of the distribution of the population (the À's). The condition in (ii) is stronger than with the second welfare theorem since we need to ensure that given any blocking sub allocation which is feasible for production set Y', there is at least as good a suballocation which is feasible for Y, and hence the expansion in the set of possible blocking suballocations under Y' has not shrunk the core. We pursue approach (i) below. Approach (ii) can be applied in our prototype economy.
PROPOsrnON 10. If C is finite, then for any core allocation z, there exist a p and y such that [z,y,p] is a quasi-competitive equilibrium.
Proot
The proof is by construction. Since z is a feasible allocation, with y = y(z) condition (iii) is satisfied. Now, we need only find a supporting price system wherein conditions (i') and (ii) are satisfied. The proof is in two parts. First we establish the existence of a supporting hyperplane which satisfies certain conditions from which we derive a price system. Then we establish that this price system along with our allocation and y(z) is a quasi-competitive equilibrium.
First, from Proposition 6, for any core allocation there is a uni que utility levei associated with each type which we denote by JLi' This utility levei implies a preferred set of net consumptions for each type xt = {x E ~: Ui(x+e i ) > JLJ Let X+ denote the convex hull of UiXt. Now, we want to establish that X+ li Y is empty. Assume otherwise; that is that there exists a set of weights {8 i } and points {xi E xt} such that E j 8 j x i E Y. But then we could construct a blocking suballocation where the relative measures of each type corresponded to those implied by these weights, and where each type i in the blocking coalition receives xi. Hence, by contradiction the intersection is empty. Given that C is finite, and hence L is finite dimensional, the Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees that there exists a separating hyperplane, which since L is finite dimensional, we can represent as a point p in L. Now, in order to establish that z, p, and y(z) is a quasi-competitive equilibrium we need only show that conditions (i') and (ii) are satisfied. To show that (ii) is satisfied, note that from the eontinuity of preferenees y(z) is in the c10sure of the set EjXt. Sinee Ejxi is a subset of the eonvex hull of U ixi and our priee system is eontinuous, this implies that p. y(z) ~ p. y for alI y E Y. By an analogous argument, where we make use of the faet that the eontinuity of preferenees implies that the support of zi is in the c10sure of xt ' we ean establish (i'). O Just as in the second welfare theorem, the existence of a eheaper point than the support of zj in i's budget set for eaeh i, along with the convexity of eonsumption sets implies that a quasi-competitive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium. In the case of deterministic competitive equilibria, consumptionsets are not convex, and this argument does nót hold. This is why this equivalence failed to hold in our simple two type example discussed earlier, even though ali agents had positive endowments of the numeraire good.
As atinai point, note that for any equal welfare Pareto optimal allocation, which includes any core or general competitive equilibrium a1location, there is an equivalent type-identical allocation.
By equivalent, we mean that the associated utilities are the same, and further the implied distribution over the underlying consumption space C by type is the same. To construct the equivalent typeidentical aIlocation of an equal welfare allocation z, simply put mass Zl(~) on sets containing the point xi = J x dz i for each i E I. To see that this new allocation is equivalent to our original allocation, note tirst that since preferences are convex, welfare leveis cannot be lower. They also cannot be higher since the initial allocation was a Pareto optimum and the new aIlocation is certainly feasible. FinaIly, note that by construction the distribution over the underlying commodity space by type is unchanged. These fairly obvious insights are what motivated our restricting ourselves to type homogeneous allocations in the previous sections of the paper.
Equivalence of Lottery and Value-Gamble Equilibria
A gambling decentralization is a two-stage process with gambles over value transfers in the tirst stage and a deterministic competitive equilibrium in the second. We will show that the set of equilibria for the two-stage gambling decentralization is equivalent to the set of lottery equilibria.
In the tirst stage of our gambling economy agents can enter into actuarially fair gambles over value transfers. The second stage of our gambling economy is just a deterministic version of our general lonery economy. The only change in switching to a deterministic economy from a lonery economy is that condition (i) in the detinition of a competitive equilibrium becomes HENf'\QUE S\MDNSII ~'8L10TEC~ M~ROlOGETOUO VARGAS fUNDACA Ci') support of X i * S; {e E argmax{uiCe): ps.Ce) :s p' e i }. We will refer to an equilibrium in our lottery economy being equivalem to an equilibrium in the gambling economy if the price funetions and output measure, and if the distributions over consumption by type are equal. The equality of distributions over consumption by type implies that ex-ante welfare leveis by type are also the same. The following proposition implies that the sets of lottery and gambling equilibria are equivalent:
PROPOsmON 11. Any lottery equilibrium allocation can be supported as a gambling equilibrium and vice versa with common price system.
Proof. We will show that if [{gi},y] and price system p is a gambling equilibrium, then allocation [{8 i (gi)},y] and price system p is a lottery equilibrium where
We also will show that if [{xi},y] and price system pis a lottery equilibrium, then [(<Pi(Xi,P)},y] and P is a gambling equilibrium where It is immediate that these mappings preserves the feasibility and profit maximization conditions of the respective de~nitions of equilibrium. Further utility leveis are the same given that the distribution of consumptions are the same for each type i. What remains is to show that if xi is a solution to type i's problem in the lottery economy, then its associated element under the mapping <P is a solution to i's problem in the gambling economy, and vice versa. The nature of the proof of this cIaim is to show that if gi satisfies the type i's gambling budget constraints then 8 i (gi) satisfies the type i's . . lottery budget constraint and that if Xl satisfies the type i's lottery budget constraint then <Pi(xl,P) satisfies the type i's gambling equilibrium budget constraints. These results imply 8 i (gi) is maximal given p, if gi is maximal given p by the following argument. Element gl being maximal for a type i and 8 i (gi) being lottery budget feasible implies the maximal utility that a type i can achieve in lottery system is at least U i (8 i (gi» = UjgCgi). If there were some other point x,i that satisfied the budget constraint and yielded higher utility, then <pj(X /i ,p) would be gambling budget feasible and yield higher utility than gi. Thus, 8 i (gi) must be maximal given p. The analogous argument establishes that given p, if xi is maximal, then <Pi(Xi,P) is maximal.
The type i budget constraint for the lottery equilibrium is (19) p' xi -p' e i s O while the type i budget constraints for the gambling equilibrium are Remark. If local nonsatiation holds for ali equilibria, the budget constraints hold with equality, and the map between equilibria of the lottery and gambling decentralizations is a bijection.
The equivalence between the set of equilibrium allocations of the gambling economy and the lottery economy makes clear that there are no gains to allowing for additional trading opportunities after the markets have shut in either of our economies. This point seems obvious with regard to our gambling economy since the final allocation is a deterministic competitive equilibrium, given the allocation of wealth that emerges from the first stage. In private information lottery economies, such U( 1t ) 
--------------L---------------------~----------------------T_~
1t o 1/2
